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PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; 
KEYSTONE FAMILY HEALTH PLAN; VISTA HEALTHPLAN, INC. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 20-cv-00653) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 20, 2020 
Before:  GREENAWAY, Jr., KRAUSE, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
 








* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




 Leslie Evans-Sampson appeals the District Court’s order dismissing her 
complaint.  For the reasons below, we will affirm. 
 In February 2020, Evans-Sampson filed a complaint against the Pennsylvania 
Department of Human Services (“Department”), her health insurance company, and the 
health plan had she enrolled in.  She was unhappy with the number of home health aide 
hours that the insurance company provided her pursuant to coverage paid for by the 
Department.  She was also dissatisfied with their delay in responding to her questions and 
concerns.  The District Court dismissed the complaint before service, concluding that the 
Department was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and that Evans-Sampson had 
not shown that the insurance company and health plan were state actors.  With respect to 
her allegations of criminal conduct, the District Court noted that she had no right to have 
any defendants charged criminally.  It dismissed the federal claims with prejudice for 
failure to state a claim and the state claims without prejudice for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  The District Court gave her thirty days to file an amended complaint 
regarding the state law claims and noted that if she failed to file an amended complaint, 
the matter would be dismissed without further notice for failure to prosecute.  Evans-




 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1  We agree with the District 
Court’s dismissal of Evans-Sampson’s federal claims.  See Maliandi v. Montclair State 
Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 82 (3d Cir. 2016) (reviewing de novo whether a party is entitled to 
Eleventh Amendment immunity).  Under the Eleventh Amendment, a civil suit may not 
be brought in federal court against a state, a state agency, or a state department, 
regardless of the relief sought, unless the state waives its immunity from suit.  Pennhurst 
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).  Evans-Sampson argues on 
appeal that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar her suit against the Department 
because she is a citizen of Pennsylvania and the Eleventh Amendment only bars suits 
against a state by citizens of another state.  However, the Supreme Court has held that 
despite the limitations in the text of the Eleventh Amendment, a suit may not be brought 
in a federal court by a citizen against her own state.  Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 
(1890). 
 We turn now to the claims against the insurance company and health plan.  We 
need not decide whether they were state actors because even if they were, Evans-
 
1 Where a District Court has dismissed a proceeding without prejudice, the dismissal is 
generally not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 unless the litigant cannot cure the defect 
or the litigant declares an intention to stand on his pleading, whereupon the District 
Court’s order becomes final.  Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 
1976) (per curiam); see also Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2019) (“a 
clear and unequivocal intent to decline amendment and immediately appeal that leaves no 
doubt or ambiguity can allow us to exercise jurisdiction.”).  After being informed of this 
jurisdictional issue, Evans-Sampson filed a “Notice of Intention to Stand on Original 




Sampson has failed to state a claim for the violation of due process.2  Tourscher v. 
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (court may affirm on any ground 
supported by the record).  In order to state a claim of the violation of the right to 
procedural due process, a litigant must allege that the Government deprived her of a 
protected interest in life, liberty, or property and that the deprivation occurred without 
due process.  Burns v. Pa. Dep’t. of Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 285 (3d Cir. 2008); see Mullane 
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (fundamental requirements 
of due process are notice and opportunity to be heard).   
The core of Evans-Sampson’s complaint is that she felt she was entitled to more 
services than the insurance company approved.3  She also believes that the company did 
not respond to her concerns quickly and thoroughly enough.  In her complaint, Evan-
Sampson gives a day-by-day, and sometimes hour-by-hour, breakdown of her 
communications with the insurance company between her initial interview for benefits on 
Friday, January 17 and her receiving the 13-page plan of care in the mail ten business 
 
have jurisdiction over the appeal. 
2 We construe the allegations in Evans-Sampson’s complaint as raising claims that her 
rights to due process were violated. 
 
3 “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an 
abstract need or desire for it.  He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.  He 
must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”  Bd. of Regents of State Colls. 
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).  We doubt, but will assume for the sake of argument, 





days later on Saturday, February 1.  Compl. at PDF pages 12-22.4  She then filed her 
complaint in the District Court on Tuesday, February 4. 
In her complaint, she argued that her rights to due process were denied when 
Appellees “instituted a medical gag,”5 and “failed to provide Departmental decisions 
regarding her healthcare services/treatments from January 17, 2020 to February 1, 2020, 
outside of the timeframes allowed by the law.”  Thus, it appears that Evan-Sampson is 
challenging the time it took for her to receive the plan of care from the insurance 
company.  She argues in her brief on appeal that due process entitles her to notice of the 
decision and a fair hearing.  She acknowledges that she received the notice of her benefits 
 
4 On January 17, 2020, after an intake appointment, Trenise Palmer did not email the plan 
of care to Evans-Sampson right away.  Evans-Sampson then sent several questions to 
Palmer who informed her she was off work and would get back to her after the holiday 
weekend.  On January 21, Evans-Sampson emailed Palmer a plan of care that she had 
developed.  On January 22, she emailed Palmer and asked that two more goals be added 
to the plan of care.  The next day, she inquired whether her proposed plan of care was 
authorized.  Palmer let her know that she would get back to her the next day.  She also 
informed Evans-Sampson that she was entitled to 3 hours of home health services per day 
for a total of 21 hours a week.  Evans-Sampson responded by asking to appeal and asking 
several detailed questions of Palmer.  Later that night, she asked how to appeal to the 
Court of Common Pleas.  Palmer responded the next morning on January 24 and stated 
that she would ask a management team to send Evan-Sampson the plan of care.  Later 
that morning, Palmer informed her that she would need to get the plan of care before 
learning of her options.  A few days later, Palmer pointed Evans-Sampson to the website 
for the Court of Common Pleas.  Evans-Sampson noted in her complaint that she tried to 
file an appeal with the Court of Common Pleas but could not do so because she did not 
include a departmental decision.  Evans-Sampson states that she received the plan of care 
in the mail on February 1.  Three days later, on Feburary 4, she filed her complaint in the 
District Court. 
 




but believes that she was entitled to receive the notice of the plan of care earlier than she 
did.   
Evans-Sampson then contends that she did not receive a fair hearing.  However, at 
the time Evans-Sampson filed the complaint in the District Court, she had received the 
plan of care in the mail only a few days before.6  She does not explain how she was 
denied a hearing in that short time period.  While she states that her premature appeals to 
the Court of Common Pleas were rejected, she did not allege that she appealed to the 
Court of Common Pleas or filed any administrative appeal challenging the plan of care 
after she received it.  On appeal, Evans-Sampson admits that if someone is dissatisfied 
with her care, she may file an appeal with the service.  She cites to a document she 
submitted which describes how to challenge a denial of a service.  She does not allege 
that she took any of these steps after receiving the plan of care.  While she argues that she 
was denied a fair hearing, it appears that Evans-Sampson was simply not patient enough 
 
that she is referring to the Appellees’ failure to send her the plan of care. 
6 Evans-Sampson notes that the Appellees should have rendered a decision on her appeal 
by February 23, 2020, thirty days after the appeal was filed.  Thus, she did not wait for 
Appellees to address her appeal before filing in the District Court.  In order to state a 
claim for failure to provide due process, a litigant must also have used any procedures 
available to challenge the deprivation, unless they were unavailable or inadequate.  Alvin 
v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000).  “A due process violation ‘is not complete 
when the deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide 
due process.’ If there is a process on the books that appears to provide due process, the 
plaintiff cannot skip that process and use the federal courts as a means to get back what 





to wait to receive the plan of care and follow the process for appealing the insurance 
company’s decision before filing her complaint in federal court.7 
Nor has Evans-Sampson stated a claim for a violation of her right to substantive 
due process.  In order to state such a claim, she needed to allege conduct that shocks the 
conscience.  Cty of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847-49 (1998).  She has not done 
so.  The short delay here certainly does not shock the conscience.  There is nothing in her 
description of events that causes concern. 
With respect to Evans-Sampson’s request that defendants be criminally 
prosecuted, an individual has no federal right to require the government to initiate 
criminal proceedings. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); see also 
United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 173-74 (3d Cir. 1973) (Government is permitted 
some selectivity in its enforcement of criminal laws).  Because the District Court 
correctly dismissed all of Evans-Sampson’s federal claims, it did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims.  Elkadrawy v. 
Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 2009). 
Evans-Sampson asks that the District Judge be recused.  As we agree with the 
District Court under de novo review that Evans-Sampson’s claims fail as a matter of law, 
we will not be remanding the matter, and there is no need for the District Judge to recuse 
 
7 While she argues on appeal that Appellees still refuse to acknowledge her appeal rights 
and she has never received a fair hearing, these allegations were not in her complaint, 




herself.  Finally, because Evans-Sampson’s allegations fail to state a claim as a matter of 
law, the District Court did not err in dismissing her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) before service and before fact-finding.   
For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by the District Court, we will 
affirm the District Court’s judgment.  Appellant’s motion to expand the record is denied. 
